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Abstract
This paper provides an empirical framework to analyse the nature of
currency crises by extending earlier work of Jeanne and Masson (2000)
who suggest that a currency crisis model with multiple equilibria can
be estimated using Markov regime switching (MRS) models. However,
Jeanne and Masson (2000) assume that the transition probabilities across
equilibria are constant and independent of fundamentals. Thus, currency
crisis is driven by a sunspot unrelated to fundamentals. This paper fur-
ther contributes to the literature by suggesting a multivariate MRS model
to analyse the nature of currency crises. In the new set up, one can test
for the impact of the unobserved dynamics of fundamentals on the prob-
ability of devaluation. Empirical evidence shows that expectations about
fundamentals, which are reected by their unobserved state variables, not
only a¤ect the probability of devaluation but also can be used to forecast
a currency crisis one period ahead.
1 Introduction
The European Monetary System crises in 1992-93, the Mexican peso crisis in
1994, the Asian u crisis in 1997, the Russian crisis in 1998, and the Brazilian
crisis in 1999 raise concerns about the nature of currency crises. There are
two main models for currency crises. The rst generation model, introduced
by Krugman (1979), is based on the idea that currency crisis is driven by bad
fundamentals such us expansionary monetary and scal policy, which lead to
We would like to thank Alessandro Flamini and Andy Dickerson, Corresponding author:
Kostas Mouratidis, Department of Economics; Email: k.Mouratidis@she¢eld.ac.uk
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a persistent loss of foreign exchange reserves that ultimately force monetary
authorities to abandon the xed exchange rate regime.
In the second generation crises model, the government is not a simple mech-
anism but, rather, an agent that minimises a loss function.1 There are two new
elements in the second generation crises model. Firstly, it considers a wider
range of fundamentals than the rst generation crises model. Secondly, it en-
dogenises monetary policy by introducing market expectations. The second
generation crises model emphasises that the contingent nature of economic poli-
cies may produce multiple equilibria and generate self-fullling crises. Thus,
the economy can be in equilibrium which is consistent with xed exchange rate
regime and sudden change of expectations may force policy makers to abandon
the peg, thereby validating agents expectations.2 An important implication of
the second generation crises model is that predicting currency crises becomes a
more di¢cult task. This is so because currency crises may occur without any
change of fundamentals. The key element that di¤erentiates the two models of
currency crises is the disconnection of fundamentals from market expectations.
Jeanne (1997, 2000), in his so-called escape-clause model, provides a the-
oretical reconciliation between the rst and second generation crises models.
Although the rst generation model argues that a currency crisis is due to ex-
pansionary monetary and scal policies, followed by policy makers, it has not
addressed the question about the introduction of these policies in the rst place.
Jeanne (2000) shows that, in the rst generation model of currency crises, there
is always a level of interest rate that monetary authorities can adopt to de-
fend the peg. However, high interest rate will have negative macroeconomic
consequences. This implies that by endogenising monetary and scal policies
in the rst generation crises model, the logic of the two models is the same.
Jeanne (2000) also argues that the two models of currency crises are not mutu-
ally exclusive. For a currency to be subject to self-fullling speculative attack,
fundamentals must rstly put the currency into the crisis zone. The precise
time and occurrence of an attack is di¢cult to be determined only on the basis
of fundamentals.
Jeanne and Masson (2000) show that strategic complementarity between
market expectations, about the intended policy rule and the policy actually
adopted, produces multiple equilibria. Jeanne (1997) and Jeanne and Masson
(2000) argue that what drives market expectations and the economy, from one
equilibrium to another, is an external event unrelated to fundamentals. This is
a sunspot which reects waves of pessimism and optimism. Jeanne and Masson
(2000) show that devaluation expectations are the sum of the probabilities of
devaluation in the next period, weighted by the transition probabilities that the
state of economy switches from the current to future states, that is
1Advocates of the second generation model of currency crises include Obstfeld (1996),
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) and Cole and Kehoe (1995).
2The logic of self-fullling crises is based on the idea that devaluation expectation increases
the cost of retaining a peg and, therefore, the desire of the policy-maker to devalue.
2
qt =
nX
s=1
pijF (Zt; Z

t ) (1)
where
F (Zt; Z

t ) = Pr ob[Zt+1 < Z

t jZt = Z]
Fx(Zt; Z

t )  0
pij = P (St+1 = jjSt = i) denotes the transition probability of the unobserved
state variable St. The state variable fStg is assumed to form a Markov chain
on 
 = f1; :::; ng. F (Zt; Z

t ) captures the observed dynamics of fundamentals
dynamics. Alternatively, St indicates the unobserved state of the probability of
devaluation.
Jeanne and Masson (2000) suggest a MRS model to apply models of cur-
rency crises with multiple equilibria to data. However, the empirical work of
Jeanne and Mason (2000) has two shortcomings. Firstly, it does not allow the
unobserved state of probability of devaluation to be a function of fundamentals.
Secondly, it evaluates currency crises using in-sample t comparison of the MRS
model and a linear model. In terms of the rst shortcoming, Filardo (1994),
Diebold et. al. (1994), and Filardo and Gordon (1998) show that the unobserved
state variable of a Markov process may be time varying, related to a group of
fundamental variables. The external uncertainty that drives the devaluation
probability across di¤erent equilibria is not independent of fundamentals. For
the second shortcoming, an in-sample forecast comparison of linear and non-
linear models is not fair, since the latter are over-parameterised. Empirical
studies such as Clements and Smith (1999) and Diebold and Nason (1990) also
show that linear models often outperform non-linear models in out-of-sample
forecast comparison.
Mouratidis (2008) takes on board both these shortcomings by comparing
the forecast performance of a Markov switching model with time-varying tran-
sition probabilities (MRS-TVP) with both a constant transition probabilities
(MRS) model and a linear benchmark. However, the MRS-TVP model used by
Mouratidis (2008) only partially takes into account the impact of fundamentals
on the unobserved state of probability of devaluation. This is so because the
MRS-TVP model only considers the impact of the observed dynamics of fun-
damentals on the unobserved state of probability of devaluation. In terms of
(1), the MRS-TVP model estimates the impact of Zt on St. However, recent
economic literature shows that fundamentals may also follow a Markov process.
This implies that St is a vector and not a scalar. Assuming that Zt includes
a single fundamental variable (say Xt), then St = [S
q
t S
x
t ] where S
q
t is the the
unobserved state of probability of devaluation and Sxt is the unobserved state
of fundamental variable Xt. The later unobserved state reects expectations
about the fundamental variable Xt. Phillips (1991) shows that S
q
t and S
x
t can
be either independent or perfectly correlated or being in a di¤erent phase. The
implication of the framework suggested by Phillips (1991) was that both the ob-
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served and unobserved dynamics of fundamentals might a¤ect the unobserved
state of probability of devaluation.
The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical framework to analyse the
nature of currency crises. We do so by employing the multivariate MRS model
suggested by Phillips (1991).3 We allow both the observed dynamics and the
unobserved state of fundamentals to a¤ect the probability of devaluation. If the
unobserved state of fundamentals has a signicant impact on the unobserved
state of probability of devaluation, then market expectation about the proba-
bility of devaluation is not unrelated to fundamentals. This is consistent with
the escape-clause model suggested by Jeanne (1997, 2000).
We analyse the nature of currency crises by implementing an out-of-sample
forecast comparison. We compare MRS models with independent unobserved
states and MRS models with either perfectly correlated states or unobserved
states that lead each other. This comparison will show whether currency crisis
is driven by a sunspot or by a combination of market expectation and fundamen-
tals. We also compare MRS models to linear models. If MRS models outperform
linear models, then currency crisis is in line with the second generation model
of currency crises.
Empirical results of this paper are based on the Italian currency crisis in
1992 and the speculative attack on the French franc in July 1993. There is a
widespread agreement that the former currency crisis was driven by bad fun-
damentals while the latter was driven by a sunspot unrelated to fundamentals.
De Grauwe (1997) reports that the Italian lira was overvalued by between 25
and 30 % in 1992, and the choice for Italy was either to deate its economy
or to use a large realignment once the large capital inows, that had nanced
the current account decit until then, came to an end. Deterioration of Italian
fundamentals before the speculative attack in 1992 raises the question whether
the Italian currency crisis was in line with the rst generation of currency crises
model rather than with currency crises driven by sunspots. In 1993, currency
markets questioned the exchanges rates within the core of the European Mon-
etary System (EMS), where there was no sign of systematic over-valuation of
the Belgian or French francs and the Danish krone. Jeanne and Masson (2000)
show that the speculative attack on the French franc in 1993 was driven by an
external uncertainty unrelated to fundamentals.
The paper proceeds by introducing the econometric methodology adopted
to analyse the Italian and French currency crises. Section 3 explains data and
empirical results from application to the Italian and French currency crises in
1992 and 1993, respectively. The nal section summarises and concludes.
2 Econometric Methodology
This section describes the methodology used by Jeanne and Masson (2000) to
estimate currency crises models with multiple equilibria. They use a uni-variate
3Sola et. al. (2007) use a general bivariate MRS model, allowing for interaction of both
unobserved states and transition probabilities to be time-varying.
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MRS model to give empirical support to the view that a currency crisis is driven
by market expectations unrelated to fundamentals. We also present and explain
the implication of the model suggested by Phillips (1991).
2.1 Proxy of probability of devaluation
In this paper, in line with Gomez-Puig and Montalvo (1997), we use the interest
rate di¤erential as a proxy for devaluation expectations, and consequently as an
indicator of credibility of a target zone exchange rate regime.4 This can be
justied by the simple Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) model:
rDt   r
G
t = Etst+1 (2)
where rDt and r
G
t are, respectively, the domestic (Italian or French) and the
German interest rates, Etst+1 denotes the expected rate of depreciation at
time t+1 given the information at time t.5 (2) is based on the assumption that
foreign exchange market risk premium is small. Svensson (1992) argues that for
a reasonable level of risk aversion a zero risk premium is a reasonable assumption
for target zone models. Ayuso and Restoy (1992) obtain small estimates for the
risk premium component of the EMS countries. This is so because the risk
premium could be diversied in the EMS.
Eichengreen et al. (1996), Mouratidis (2008), and Fratzcher (2003) employ
the actual exchange market pressure (EMP) as an indicator of devaluation prob-
ability. This is the weighted average of the change of exchange rate, the change
of interest rate di¤erential, and the change of foreign exchange reserves:
EMPt = w1st + w2(r
D
t   r
G
t )  w3Rt (3)
where the weights, ws, are calculated as the inverse of the series variance. EMP
indicates that if the central bank faces a currency pressure can either devalue,
or increase interest rates, and/or reduce foreign exchange reserves (R).
The interest rate di¤erential is the product of the probability of devaluation
and its size:
rDt   r
G
t = qtst+1.
If st+1 is chosen to be a reasonable value, say a conventional 10 or 20 % (or
the average of historical devaluations), and with interest rate di¤erential much
lower, it is very unlikely that the estimate of the probability, that is qt =
rDt  r
G
t
st+1
,
would even approach unity, much less exceed it.6 As for the exchange market
4Jeanne and Masson (2000) also use the interest rate di¤erential as a proxy of devalutaion
probability, investigating the nature of the French currency crises in 1993.
5Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) argue that tying their hands the authorities of a high
ination country lower the output cost of disination. In view of this, the EMS was used as
a mechanism to transer credibility from Germany to other EMS countries. Therefore, we use
Germany as the reference country to evaluate monetary policy of the rest EMS countries.
6The model itself, which relies on the cumulative distribution, will produce a probability
bounded by 0 and 1. Jeanne (1997) shows that
qt = F (qt   Zt), (4)
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pressure, we dene it as qt = (EMPt   w1st + w3Rt)=w2st+1. Thus, one
has a more di¢cult task in mapping it into a probability measure, since it also
includes a variable, reserves, that has no particular relation to a devaluation
probability.
2.2 MRS Model
Jeanne and Masson (2000) employ the following MRS model to explain the
probability of devaluation in the speculative attack of the French franc in 1993:
qt = st + 
0Zt + t (5)
where Zt is a vector of indicators and st is the unobserved state of probability
of devaluation. They assume that the transition probabilities of st is time
invariant. With 2 regimes, the transition between regimes is characterised by
a (2  2) transition probability matrix p = [p]ij , with i; j = 1; 2. Each pij
gives the transition probability that regime i will be followed by regime j (every
column of p sums to unity). However, transition across states may be driven
by an external uncertainty unrelated to fundamentals. Thus, the assumption of
constant transition probabilities may be restrictive. Cipollini et al. (2008) and
Mouratidis (2008) extend the work of Jeanne and Masson (2000) by allowing the
transition probabilities of fstg to be a function of fundamentals. If the vector
of economic fundamentals that determine the transition probabilities at time t
is Zt, the time-varying transition probabilities have the following form
7 :
pij;t = exp
 
ij;t + Z
0
t 1ij;t

=

1 + exp
 
ij;t + Z
0
t 1ij;t

; i; j = 1; 2. (6)
The implication of this specication is that fundamentals can help to predict
future behaviour of the unobserved state variable of probability of devaluation.
Now, we further extend this approach using a bivariate MRS model to esti-
mate the impact the unobserved state of fundamentals has on the unobserved
state of probability of devaluation. The aim of this exercise is to nd whether
there is interaction between market expectations, concerning the probability of
devaluation, and market expectations about the unobserved state of economic
fundamentals.
In terms of (5) we assume that not only qt, but also Zt, follow Markov
process. To make our argument clear, we further assume that Zt includes a
single variable (Xt). Phillips (1991) shows that the unobserved states s
q
t and
sxt could be either independent or perfectly correlated. Phillips (1991) also
shows that unobserved states may be in a di¤erent phase such as sqt leads s
x
t
and vice versa.8 The interaction of unobserved states has implications on both
where  is the probability that the policy maker is in a "soft" mood and  indicates the impact
of market expectation, for devaluation, on the policy makers benet function.
7For more details on this model, see Filardo (1994), Diebold et. al. (1994), and Filardo
and Gordon (1998).
8Bengonechea, Camacho and Quiros (2006) and Camacho and Quiros (2006) used a model
where the unobserved states are partially correlated.
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the nature of currency crises and the appropriate framework needed to model
market expectation.
To illustrate the implications that the interaction of unobserved states has
for the nature of currency crises consider a 2 1 vector zt = [qt; Xt]
0 such that
zt = st +
pX
i=1
ivt i (7)
where qt = r
D
t   r
G
t , Xt a column of Zt and vt = [u
q
t ; u
x
t ]
0 is a Gaussian process
with mean zero and positive-denite variance covariance matrix ; fstg is mod-
elled as a linear homogenous four-state Markov process with
st = 1 if s
x
t = 1 and s
q
t = 1 (8)
st = 2 if s
x
t = 2 and s
q
t = 1
st = 3 if s
x
t = 1 and s
q
t = 2
st = 4 if s
x
t = 2 and s
q
t = 2
where sxt and s
q
t represent the unobserved states of Xt and qt, respectively. In
the rst model, where sxt and s
q
t are independent, the transition probability
matrix is given by
PAqx = P
q 
 P x =
2
664
pq
11
px
11
pq
11
px
21
pq
21
px
11
pq
21
px
21
pq
11
px
12
pq
11
px
22
pq
21
px
12
pq
21
px
22
pq
12
px
11
pq
12
px
21
pq
22
px
11
pq
22
px
21
pq12p
x
12
pq
12
px
22
pq
22
px
12
pq
22
px
22
3
775 . (9)
We call this model A. It is worth noting that we impose the restriction that
transition probabilities across regimes are constant (i.e. ij;t = 0). This re-
striction does not a¤ect our argument about the importance of fundamentals;
it provides further support. This is so because if ij;t 6= 0, then
pq
ij
= exp
 
q;ij;t + Z
0
t i 1q;ij;t

=

1 + exp
 
q;ij;t + Z
0
t i 1q;ij;t

(10)
px
ij
= exp
 
x;ij;t + Z
0
t i 1x;ij;t

=

1 + exp
 
x;ij;t + Z
0
t i 1x;ij;t

(11)
This is a general framework where fundamentals a¤ect the probability of de-
valuation through two channels. The rst channel concerns the impact of the
observed dynamics of fundamentals given by (10). The second channel, which
is the object of this paper, focuses on the impact that the unobserved state
of fundamentals (sxt ) has on the unobserved state of probability of devaluation
(sqt ). Thus, imposing the restriction ij;t = 0, we constrain the channels through
which fundamentals can a¤ect the probability of devaluation. The implication
of model A is that expectations about the future state of fundamentals do not
have any impact on the expectation of probability of devaluation. In this set up
currency crisis is driven by a sunspot.
One hypothesis suggested by Schwert (1989 a, b) and Campell et al. (1993)
is perfect synchronisation between sqt and s
x
t (s
q
t = s
x
t ). The unobserved state
7
variable st follows a two-state Markov process with transition probability ma-
trix9 :
PBqx =
2
664
pq
11
px
11
0 0 pq
21
px
21
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
pq12p
x
12
0 0 pq
22
px
22
3
775 (12)
We call this model B. This model implies that the unobserved state of funda-
mentals provides information for the unobserved state of probability of devalu-
ation, but this information concerns the nature, rather than, the predictability
of a currency crisis. That is, although fundamentals matter for the genesis of
crises, they cannot be used to predict it. The interesting element of this case is
that the escape-clause model of Jeanne (2000) will be observationally equivalent
to the self-fullling model of Obsteld (1996).10
Expectations about the probability of devaluation might a¤ect the current
state of fundamentals which could be modelled by imposing sqt = s
x
t 1. This
reduces the full transition probability matrix to
PCqx =
2
664
pq
11
px
11
0 pq
21
px
11
0
pq
11
px
12
0 pq
21
px
12
0
0 pq
12
px
21
0 pq
22
px
21
0 pq
12
px
22
0 pq
22
px
22
3
775 . (13)
The implication of this implicit causality is that a currency crisis is driven by a
sunspot unrelated to fundamentals. We denote this new model as C. Although
models A and C have led to the same view about the nature of currency crises,
they di¤er in terms of their forecasting ability. In Model C the relationship
between sqt and s
x
t has two o¤setting e¤ects. Although, changes of s
q
t have
positive learning e¤ects about the current state of sxt , they also increase the
variability of sxt . In this set up, it will become very di¢cult to forecast currency
crisis on the basis of fundamentals. In practice, we expect model C to have
better in sample-t than model A, but worse out of sample forecast performance.
Finally, expected deterioration of fundamentals might a¤ect the current state
of probability of devaluation (sxt = s
q
t 1). The implication of this model is that
expectations about the future state of fundamentals may a¤ect the current state
of probability of devaluation. If this is the case, the dynamics of the unobserved
state of fundamentals will not only a¤ect the probability of devaluation but also
they will be able to predict currency crises one period ahead. Hence, sunspots
are related to fundamentals and the nature of a currency crisis will be in line
with the escape-clause model of Jeanne (1997, 2000). We denote this model as
9For more details see Hamilton and Lin (1996) and Sola et al. (2002 and 2007). A similar
framework is used by Bengoechea, Camacho and Quiros (2006).
10Here the term observationally equivalent means that, on the basis of the observed dynam-
ics of fundamentals, both models (escape-clause and self-fullling) have the same predictive
power.
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D. We can model this hypothesis by reducing the full Pqx matrix to
PDqx =
2
664
pq
11
px
11
pq
11
px
21
0 0
0 0 pq
21
px
12
pq
21
px
22
pq
12
px
11
pq
12
px
21
0 0
0 0 pq
22
px
12
pq
22
px
22
3
775 . (14)
The implication of (13) and (14) is that there is interaction between market ex-
pectations about the probability of devaluation and the future state of economic
fundamentals. Modelling this interaction may enable us to forecast currency
crises one period ahead.
3 Forecast Evaluation
This section describes the properties of optimal forecasts under the assumption
that forecasters have a quadratic loss function (QLF). We also discuss forecast
evaluation under various loss functions.
3.1 Properties of Optimal Forecasts
If a forecaster has a QLF and the data generation process (DGP) of predicted
variable yt is linear, the optimal forecast is the conditional mean (Etyt+h,
h > 0).11 Diebold and Lopez (1996) and Patton and Timmermann (2007)
discuss the properties of rational forecasts. Provided that both the target and
predicted variables are jointly stationary, the rational forecast satises the fol-
lowing properties:
 Forecast is unbiased. This implies that on average forecast errors are equal
to zero E(yt+h   yt+hjt) = 0.
 Forecast errors are orthogonal to the information set, available to the
forecaster when the forecast is made.
 The variance of the forecast error is a non-decreasing function of forecast
horizon.
 h-step-ahead forecast errors are serially uncorrelated beyond an order of
h  1.
 The one-step-ahead forecast error is serially uncorrelated.
A test for rationality is usually based on the regression
yt+h = + yt+hjh + t+1 (15)
11Et() denotes conditional expectation based on information available at time t, h is the
forecast horizon.
where the null hypothesis is H0 :  = 0 and  = 1: However, Holden and Peel
(1993) show that a more satisfactory test for unbiasedness is to test for c = 0
in the regression
et+hjt = c+ t+1 (16)
where et+hjt is the forecast error at forecast horizon h.
12 Although a test for
c = 0 is described as a test for unbiasedness, it can be also be viewed as a test
for e¢ciency, in the sense that forecast errors are uncorrelated with forecasts,
that is
Et(et+hjt; yt+hjt) = 0. (17)
If forecasts are unbiased, the nature of a currency crisis depends on the
interaction of the unobserved states of each variable included in the multivari-
ate MRS model. This is so because, unbiased forecasts imply that forecasters
have used all the observable information at the time of forecast. Thus, any
impact of fundamentals on the probability of devaluation will be through the
unobserved states of fundamentals. Alternatively, if forecasts are biased and
unobserved states are uncorrelated, the currency crisis is driven by a sunspot.
Biased forecast implies that forecasters are irrational in the sense that they dis-
regard information from fundamentals. Irrational forecast, in conjunction with
uncorrelated unobserved state, indicates that fundamentals do not inuence
the probability of devaluation. Under such circumstances, currency crises are
driven by market expectation unrelated to fundamentals. Finally, if forecasts
are biased and the unobserved states are correlated, in line with model D (i.e.
sxt = s
q
t 1), it is important to check whether forecasts are biased over the whole
out-of-sample period, or at certain points before the currency crisis. Evidence
that forecasts become irrational before a currency crisis may be considered as
early warning signal that a currency crisis may be imminent.13
If forecasters have a QLF then it is straightforward to show that the RMSFE
can been used as a criterion for forecast evaluation. However, Granger (1969,
1999), Cristo¤ersen and Diebold (1997) and Patton and Timmermann (2007)
show that if forecasters have an asymmetric loss function, then standard prop-
erties of optimal forecasts do not hold. Elliott et al. (2005, 2007) proposed
a rationality test under asymmetric loss function in a GMM framework. Al-
ternatively, a density forecast criterion can be used to select the best forecast
among di¤erent forecasting models. Diebold et al. (1998) show how the density
forecast criterion is optimal regardless of the loss function of decision maker.
Assessing whether a density forecast is correct with respect to observed out-
comes is associated with a goodness-of-t test. The two classical non-parametric
approaches to test goodness-of-t are the likelihood ratio and Pearsons chi-
12Under the null H0 :  = 0 and  = 1; if we substract yt+hjh from both sides of (15) we
obtain (16).
13 Irrationality before currency crisis implies that it becomes increasingly di¢cult to guess
the probability of devaluation, based only on the observed dynamics of fundaments. Thus,
speculative attack will be very sensitive to any news about fundamentals. Under such an
uncertain environment, it is a matter of time for currency crisis to occur.
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squared test.14 An alternative group of goodness-of-t tests is based on the
probability integral transform. If F () is an estimated density forecast then
z = F (y) where y is the observed outcome, has a U [0; 1] distribution. Deviation
of z from U [0; 1] indicates that the estimated density forecast F () is not correct.
Diebold et al. (1998) show that if a sequence of density forecasts is correctly
conditionally calibrated, then zsequence is iid U [0; 1].15 Berkowitz (2001) sug-
gests an alternative goodness-of-t test where instead of testing for uniformity
of z it may be more fruitful to test for normality of the inverse cumulative dis-
tribution function (CDF) transformation of z. Under the null, the sequence fzg
is i.i.d. N(0; 1). The argument of Berkowitz (2001) for normality test was that
more powerful tools can be employed to test for normality than uniformity. For
one-step ahead forecasts, Berkowitz (2001) proposes a likelihood ratio test for
the joint null hypothesis that standardised forecast errors zt s have zero mean,
unit variance and are independent, allowing them to potentially follow an AR(1)
process. The Berkowitz test is computed as
zt = c+ z

t 1 + "t (18)
LRB =  2[L(0; 1; 0)  L(bc; b2; ^)]
where L(bc; b2; ^) is the value of the maximised log-likelihood for the AR(1)
model and L(0; 1; 0) is the constrained log-likelihood. Under the null LRB  
2
3.
Forecasts may be biased due to a wrong model employed to forecast the
predicted variable. We control for this by using the density forecast test of
Berkowitz (2001). However, since Berkowitzs (2001) test is a joint test of nor-
mality and autocorrelation, it is di¢cult to nd why a statistical model fails the
density forecast test. Alternatively, the test suggested by Diebold et. al. (1998)
detects separately whether a model fails the distributional assumption or the
assumption of no autocorrelation. Therefore, using the Diebold et. al. test, we
can nd why a model fails the density forecast test.
14Both these tests are based on dividing the range of variable into k mutually exclusive cells
and comparing the observed relative frequencies with the probabilities of outcomes falling in
these cells given by the forecast densities; see Wallis (2003). However, if the distribution is
continuous, consideration of only the cell frequencies does not fully reect the information
available in the observations of each cell (see also Wallis (2003)).
15The density forecast is constructed as follows. We assume that disturbances are i.i.d.
Gaussian. Then if byt+1 is the one-step-ahead forecast of yt+1 made at time t and bt+1 is the
standard deviation of byt+1, then the Gaussian density forecast is F (yt+1) = N(byt+1; bt+1).
Then the probability integral transform values are given by fzt+1g = f((
yt+1 byt+1
bt+1
))g where
 is the normal cdf. fzt+1g = f(
yt+1 byt+1
bt+1
)g are the stadardised forecast errors that are
distributed N(0; 1) under the null. Here to test for normality, we employ the Doornik-Hansen
(1994) test. To test for independence of zt+1 we use the Ljung-Box for autocorrelation see
Harvey et al. (1989) p. 259; we consider up to the third momment.
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4 Data and Empirical Results
Data were taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database.
Monthly average of money market rates were used in the empirical analysis,
dened as the short-term borrowing rates between nancial institution over the
period January 1979 to April 1998.16 Industrial production was also selected
from the same source as above (line 66). Empirical results are based on one-
step-ahead forecasts computed recursively from April 1988 to April 1998. Let
us consider the case of a hypothetical forecaster, who at time t needs to forecast
the probability of devaluation at t+ 1, with t going from March 1988 to March
1998, and starting date of the sample being constant. At each point of time,
the forecaster uses the estimated coe¢cients at time t to forecast time t + 1.
Then, when a new observation becomes available, the forecaster re-estimates
the model using data up to time t + 1 to forecast time t + 2. The process is
iterated recursively until the last in-sample period March 1998.
We focus in the periods before currency crises. This is to evaluate the fore-
casting abilities of both linear and non-linear models to forecast the speculative
attack on the Italian lira in September 1992 and the French franc in July 1993.
We employ a rst order autoregressive AR(1) model, a bivariate vector autore-
gressive (BVAR) model, and a bivariate linear regression model (LIN BVAR)17
as linear counterparts of the bivariate MRS model presented above. We use as
a proxy for the fundamentals, the growth rate of industrial production (DIP ).
We have experimented with other fundamentals, such as the real exchange rate
of the Italian lira and the French franc against the DM, but the results remain
qualitatively similar.
Table 1 shows that neither the lags of the interest rate di¤erential (IRD)
a¤ect the growth rate of industrial production, nor the lags of the latter a¤ect
the former.18 Granger causality tests also show that there is no causality be-
tween IRD and real exchange rate. On the basis of these results, we employ a
multivariate MRS model where every individual variable is a¤ected by its own
lag:19 
qt   st
xt   vt

=

11 0
0 22

qt   st 1
xt   vt 1

+

1
2

(19)
16Money market rates were selected from line 60 b. The starting date almost coincides with
the inception of the EMS.
17The linear bivariate model includes the rst lagged value of qt = rDt   r
G
t and the growth
rate of industrial production as explanatory variables. The LIN BVAR is given by:
qt = qt 1 + xt + ut
where xt = DIPt, and ut is the stochastic disturbance.
18Table 1 presents results from a second order vector autoregressive model VAR(2). Al-
though the optimal number of lags, based on AIC criterion is 1, we have selected 2 lags. This
is so because, for a short period of time before the crisis of 1992, the AIC shows that the
optimal number of lags is two.
19We have also experimented with a model including two lags but we faced computational
problems concerning convergence.
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Table 1: Estimation of Linear BVAR Model
Variables IRD t-stat DIP t-stat
Italy
IRD(-1) 1.151 -17.689 -0.003 -0.978
IRD(-2) -0.163 -2.495 0.003 -1.033
DIP(-1) -0.777 -0.593 0.464 -7.43
DIP(-2) 0.144 -0.11 0.329 -5.277
C -0.047 -0.487 0.004 -0.97
France
IRD(-1) 1.002 -14.974 0.001 -0.650
IRD(-2) -0.097 -1.448 0.000 -0.190
DIP(-1) -0.646 -0.175 0.555 -8.696
DIP(-2) 2.293 -0.617 0.320 -4.987
C -0.271 -2.564 0.003 -1.653
where the vector (1t; 2t)
0 follows an i.i.d. bivariate Gaussian distribution:
1
2

 N

0
0

;

11 12
21 22

. (20)
We assess the nature of a currency crisis in two steps. First, we compare
the maximised likelihood values of the four MRS models. That is, we focus
on currency crisis with multiple equilibria, assessing whether it is driven by a
sunspot (self-fullling currency crisis model) or by a combination of fundamen-
tals and market expectations (the escape-clause model). However, an in-sample
t doesnt not necessary imply a good forecasting performance of the relevant
model. Thus, in the second step, we compare the forecast performance of linear
and non-linear models. The ML values and measures of forecast performance
have been used as complementary indicators to evaluate the various models in
our study. Under such circumstances, we asses the nature of currency crisis by
comparing the forecast performance of all linear and non-linear models. If the
linear model outperforms MRS models, then the currency crisis is driven only
by fundamentals in line with Krugmans rst generation model.
For each sample presented in the rst column of Table 2, we have computed
the average log-likelihood values of all MRS models. Table 2 shows that in the
case of Italy model D has the highest maximised log-likelihood values (ML)
among the four MRS models. This is especially the case for the period after
the speculative attack in 1992. Model D implies that the current state of IRD
is a¤ected by expectations about the future state of DIP. This is consistent
with the view that currency crisis is driven by both fundamentals and market
expectations. Thus, the Italian currency crisis in (1992) was not unrelated to
fundamentals. This is consistent with De Grauwe (1994), who argued that there
was a widespread agreement that Spain and Italy experienced a higher ination
rate than the EMS average during 1987-1992. During this period, without any
realignment, tensions had been building up for these two countries in the form of
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a growing loss of competitiveness. De Grauwe (1997) reports that the currencies
of the two countries were overvalued in 1992 by between 25 and 30 % and the
choice for both countries was either to deate their economies or to use a large
realignment once the large capital inows, that had nanced the current account
decit until then, came to an end.
Table 2: The Average Maximum Likelihood of MRS Models
MRS A MRS B MRS C MRS D
Italy
Full Sample -411.279 -408.603 -405.637 -404.137
Before Crisis -509.281 -503.854 -502.878 -497.73
After Crisis -593.714 -585.916 -586.654 -578.365
1988:5-1990:10 -374.093 -371.25 -367.786 -366.53
1990:11-1993:4 -464.9 -461.588 -459.645 -457.62
1993:5-1995:10 -551.428 -543.44 -543.226 -535.765
1995:11-1998:4 -652.924 -645.399 -647.083 -637.028
France
Full Sample -556.41 -528.77 -533.735 -511.048
Before Crisis -442.397 -420.027 -422.019 -397.2
After Crisis -643.427 -633.288 -627.058 -605.843
1988:5-1990:10 -411.235 -389.451 -380.37 -356.261
1990:11-1993:4 -489.721 -471.225 -486.255 -461.457
1993:5-1995:10 -598.659 -572.198 -578.063 -556.975
1995:11-1998:4 -718.59 -673.791 -683.323 -662.496
We test for density forecast using the procedures suggested by Berkowitz
(2001) and Diebold et. al. (1998). Empirical results show that both linear
and non-linear models fail Berkowitzs test. Figure 1 and 2 show recursive es-
timates of Diebold et. al. (1998) density forecast test (i.e. tests for normality
and autocorrelation) concerning the four MRS models. The key nding of these
gures is that some models fail the normality test and some the autocorrelation
test. It is also worth noting that for some models, the failure of any of the
tests happens for the period before the crisis and for some models for the period
after the crisis. Figure 3 and 4 present recursive tests for non-normality and
autocorrelation for the standardised forecast errors of linear models. Figure 3
indicates that models fail the non-normality test few months before the specu-
lative attack in September 1992. Figure 4 shows that all linear models pass the
test for autocorrelation.
Evidence that all models fail Berkowitzs test implies that optimal forecasts
depend on forecasters loss function. However, we know that within each regime
the forecaster has a quadratic loss function. Therefore, we compare the fore-
cast performance of linear and non-linear models on the basis of the RMSFE
criterion.
Figure 5 presents estimates of RMSFE computed recursively for the two best
performing models. More concretely, Figure 5 indicates the RMSFE of MRS
14
for model C and the RMSFE of AR(1).20 Results from RMSFE imply that the
currency in 1992 was driven by a sunspot. Although this is not consistent with
the implication of Table 2, it is in line with our argument that an in-sample t
does not necessary imply that the model has a good-forecasting performance.
However, for the period before the currency crisis in 1992, the Diebold and
Mariano (1995) (DM) test rejects the null that Model C is signicantly di¤erent
from Model D. Alternatively, the DM test does not reject the null for the period
after the crisis of 1992.21 The DM test and results from ML values imply that
fundamentals play a role in the crisis of 1992, but that was not the case in the
speculative attacks of 1993 and 1995.
Figure 6 provides further evidence in favour of non-linear models. Figure
6 presents the p-values of the null hypothesis that forecast errors are on aver-
age zero. In our set up where we know both the model and the forecasters
loss function,22 a p-value above 0.05 indicates that a forecast is unbiased. All
non-linear models are found unbiased at least for the period before the currency
crisis in September 1992. Unlike MRS models, linear models are found biased.23
This is so because, given the assumption that forecasters have a quadratic loss
function, if the true data generating process is non-linear, then a linear model
will systematically over-predict or under-predict the predicted variable. How-
ever, if regimes have di¤erent duration then over- and under-prediction will not
cancel each other out and the mean of forecast errors will be signicantly dif-
ferent from zero. Under such circumstances, a nonlinear model will be optimal
in terms of using e¢ciently all current available information. More concretely,
linear models, ignoring information concerning future states of expectation of
devaluation, fail to adjust their forecast ex-ante leading to over-prediction or
under-prediction of the forecasted variable.
The di¤erence between the crisis in 1992 and the crises in 1993 and 1995
was that, in the latter crises, the currencies were not overvalued unlike certain
currencies (sterling, lira, peseta, and Swedish Krona) in 1992. The correction
of the over-valuation, after 1992, proved that the new level of the exchange
rate was resilient in the long run. In 1995, the peseta and the lira were under
strong pressure as an increase in US interest rates raised doubts about the
capability of these countries to service their high domestic decits without using
an inationary policy. In the last storm of 1995, the peseta used the wide
margins (10-12 %) and devaluated by 7 %, while the lira went more than 60 %
above the pre-1992 parity.
In addition to this argument, since 1983, French monetary authorities have
followed a competitive disination policy aiming at reducing ination to a lower
level than ination in Germany, thereby attempting to improve competitive-
ness and therefore growth. However, this policy of competitiveness through
disination has been successful only at bringing down ination and not at cre-
20Estimates of all other linear and non-linear models are available upon request.
21The p-values of DM test for the periods before and after the crisis of 1992 were 0.771 and
0.045 respectively.
22The use of the ML method indicates that within each regime the forecaster has a QLF.
23Exception to this is the AR(1) model which becomes unbiased after the currency crisis.
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ating a higher level of employment, which was lower after than before 1983 (see
Blanchard and Muet (1993)).
Unlike the case of Italy, results from France show that speculative attacks
on the French franc were driven by a sunspot. All models, linear and non-linear,
fail the density forecast test of Diebold et. al. (1998). However, Figure 7 shows
that the MRS model D passes Berkowitzs density forecast test for the period
before the currency crisis in 1992. Table 2 also shows that the MRS model D has
the highest maximum likelihood value among all MRS models. Although both
density forecast tests and the maximum likelihood values favour MRS model
D, Figure 8 shows that MRS model A has the lowest RMSFE among all MRS
models. Figure 9 provides clear evidence that the best performing MRS model
A outperforms the forecast performance of best linear AR(1) model. The DM
test rejects the null that MRS model A is signicantly di¤erent form MRS model
D but does not reject the null when we compare MRS model A and the AR(1)
model.
Model A and Model D have di¤erent implications about the nature of cur-
rency crises. Under such circumstances, we rely on empirical fact which provides
support to the former model. This is so because, in the crisis of 1993 and the
stormy period of 1995, the situation was di¤erent from the crisis of 1992 as
the over-valuations of the peripheral currencies were corrected. The currency
markets attacked currencies such as the Belgian franc, the French franc and the
Danish korone that appeared not to be systematically overvalued. According
to Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) and Kenen (1995), the crisis of 1993 was
the result of market expectations about future changes in the French (and some
small countries) monetary policy because of the belief that the governments of
these countries were in di¤erent cyclical position to Germany and would like
to follow a di¤erent policy. In addition to this argument, Gross and Thygesen
(1998) show that, by 1991, the French franc had depreciated in real e¤ective
terms, by about 10 %, since 1980. When this is viewed with current account
and the policy of competitiveness through disination, followed by France after
1983, one can be condent that the French franc was not overvalued. However,
the negative results of the Danish referendum in 1992, and the French presiden-
tial election (1993), made the French franc suspect to speculative attack. Thus,
the crisis of 1993 is consistent with the analysis of a self-fullling speculative
attack.
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Figure 1: Italy: Test for Normality: The Case of Non-linear Models.
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Figure 2: Italy: Test for Autocorrelation: The case of Non-linear Models
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5 Conclusion
The aim of this study is to provide an empirical framework to analyze the
nature of currency crises. We do so by extending earlier work of Jeanne and
Masson (2000) and Mouratidis (2008). Jeanne and Masson (2000) suggest that a
currency crisis model with multiple equilibria can be estimated by a MRS model.
However, Jeanne and Masson (2000) assume that the transition probabilities
across equilibria are constant and independent of fundamentals. In this set up,
currency crisis is driven by a sunspot unrelated to fundamentals. Mouratidis
(2008) shows that the transition probabilities may be time-varying, based on
fundamentals behaviour. Under such circumstances, currency crisis is in line
with the escape-clause model and is driven by both fundamentals and sunspots.
More concretely, fundamentals rstly put a currency into the crisis zone and
then a sunspot determines the timing of speculative attack.
Although a MRS model with time-varying transition probabilities captures
the impact of observed dynamics of fundamentals on the probability of devalua-
tion, it still disregards the impact of the unobserved dynamics of fundamentals
on the probability of devaluation. Here, in line with recent literature in macro-
economics, we assume that not only the probability of devaluation, but also
fundamentals follow Markov processes. If this is the case then we can adopt the
multivariate MRS model suggested by Phillips (1991) to examine the interaction
between the unobserved states of fundamentals and the unobserved state of the
probability of devaluation.
Phillips (1991) shows that the unobserved states of fundamentals, included
in a multivariate MRS model, may be either independent or perfectly correlated
or being in a di¤erent phase. In this set up, if the unobserved state of funda-
mentals is independent of the unobserved state of probability of devaluation,
then currency crisis is driven by a sunspot. Alternatively, if the unobserved
state of fundamentals is perfectly correlated with the unobserved state of prob-
ability of devaluation, then currency crisis is consistent with the escape-clause
model of Jeanne (1997, 2000). Finally, if unobserved state of fundamentals is
in a di¤erent phase of that of the unobserved state of probability of devalua-
tion, and the unobserved state of fundamentals leads the unobserved state of
the probability of devaluation, then fundamentals not only can explain currency
crisis but they can also predict it at least one period ahead. If unobserved states
are in a di¤erent phase, but the unobserved state of fundamentals is led by the
unobserved state of the probability of devaluation, then currency crisis is driven
by a sunspot.
Empirical evidence was mixed. In the case of Italy, although the max-
imised likelihood values support model D, where expectation of devaluation
is a¤ected by expectation about fundamentals, the out-of-sample forecast com-
parison shows that the speculative attacks in 1993 and 1995 were driven by
market expectations unrelated to fundamentals. This is so because Model C
outperforms both linear and non-linear models after the crisis in 1992. This
implies that fundamentals not only a¤ect expectation of devaluation, but they
can be used to forecast currency crisis one step ahead. On the other hand, in
18
the case of France, there is clear evidence that the best performing model was
the MRS model A, which justies that the speculative attacks on the French
franc were driven by a sunspot.
An extension of our suggested framework could be to allow both the ob-
served and the unobserved dynamics of fundamentals to a¤ect the probability
of devaluation. We can do so by making the transition probabilities of (17)
time-varying. Thus, in such a set up, we could distinguish between the di¤er-
ent channels that fundamentals inuence the probability of devaluation.24 This
potential research approach is left for the future.
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